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The inflation of recent decades has precipitated an increase in the
number of estates subject to potential estate and inheritance tax liability.'
In response to this development, individuals desirous of making the most
efficacious distribution of their wealth have employed special trust devices,
transfers through gift before death, and many other similar methods to
avoid such taxation wherever possible. The inter-vivos gift, because of its
liberal exemption provisions and low-rate structure, has proven particularly
attractive and practical. 2 Its recent utilization by guardians of the property
of mental incompetents to effect tax-saving objectives has infused a new
legal significance into this mode of transfer. The purpose of this comment
is to explore the employment of this tool by the guardian. Consideration
will be directed to the historical framework within which he must operate
and the problems facing him as a result of its progression.
II.
THE HISTORICAL SETTING
The jurisdictions of our courts over the property of persons non
compos mentis can be traced to our English predecessors. Originally, the
king possessed such jurisdiction as part of his executive power, and the
chancellor administered the proceedings as the personal representative of
the king.8 The Chancery courts themselves enjoyed no inherent equitable
power over the property of an incompetent.4 Only after an adjudication
of incompetency and the appointment of a committee to care for the ward's
property did they acquire further jurisdiction, which enabled them to
supervise the conduct of the committee. 5 American courts, on the contrary,
viewed their power as arising from various sources. Some asserted that
jurisdiction was inherent in the court of equity;6 others concurred in a
variant of the English view and contended that any power was purely
statutory. 7 Whatever the position originally espoused, statutes now regu-
1. INT. Rnv. CODE oF 1954, § 2052. An exemption of $60,000 is allowed from the
value of the gross estate before the estate tax is computed.
2. INT. REv. CODE ol 1954, § 2052. The gift tax rate fluctuates between a low
of 2V%4 and a high of 57/49% with the first $5,000 exempt. The Code recognizes a
specific exemption of $30,000, § 2521; a deduction for gifts to charity and similar
purposes, § 2522; and an exclusion of $3,000 for gifts to any one person during a
calendar year, § 2503. On the other hand, the estate tax commences at 3% and con-
cludes at 77%, and equals 11/3 times the comparable gift tax rates, § 2001.
3. 3 POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE 1311 (4th ed. 1918).
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. In re Hudelson's Estate, 18 Cal. 2d 401, 115 P.2d 805 (1941).
7. Hamilton v. Traber, 78 Md. 26, 27 Ati. 229 (1893) ; 3 POMEROY, op. cit. supra
note 3, § 1313.
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late to a large extent the control courts may exercise over the estate of the
incompetent and generally define the purposes for which expenditures
may be authorized.8
The first reported decision permitting distributions from an incom-
petent's estate to benefit persons other than the ward was Ex parte
Whitbread.9 These payments were predicated on the principle that the
court would not refuse to do for the incompetent that which he himself
would probably have done were he mentally sound. The so-called doctrine
of substitution of judgment enunciated in this case was employed to approve
allowances out of surplus income to relatives. Subsequent English decisions
extended the application of the principle to sanction similar gifts to non-
relatives'0 as well as those to charitable and religious institutions."
American courts further developed the doctrine and permitted distributions
from the principal of the ward's estate ;12 the few decisions that declined
to countenance this view ultimately attributed their inertia to the absence
of any statutory authorization.' 3
III.
THE CURRENT CASE LAW
The need of prospective donees provided the impetus for most of these
grants, but distributions for other reasons 14 indicated that impoverishment,
although dominant, was not a sine qua non. The cases present two require-
ments that must be satisfied before any awards will be approved. First,
the incompetent must be amply provided for in the manner to which he
is accustomed, 15 and secondly, the probability that he would have pursued
this course of conduct, had his capacity to act not been impaired, must be
reasonably demonstrated.' 0
The first reported case to consider a guardian's petition for permission
to distribute some assets of the incompetent in order to effect a contem-
plated tax saving for the heirs was Bullock Estate.'7 The estate con-
sisted of about $47,000 in bonds and other assets, including a disability
insurance policy and a pension, which in the year prior to the petition had
8. E.g., DZL. CODn ANN. tit. 12, § 3921 et seq. (1953).
9. 2 Mer. 99, 35 Eng. Rep. 878 (1816).
10. Re Carysfort, 1 Cr. & Ph. 76, 41 Eng. Rep. 418 (1840) (servant); Re
Whitaker, 42 Ch. Div. 119 (1889) (fulfill a moral obligation).
11. Re Strickland, L.R. 6 Ch. 226 (1871).
12. In re Bond, 198 Misc. 256, 98 N.Y.S.2d 81 (1950) ; In re Fleming's Estate,
173 Misc. 851, 19 N.Y.S.2d 234 (1940). But see Re Whitaker, 42 Ch. Div. 119 (188.9),
where this position was implicitly recognized.
13. Kelly v. Scott, 215 Md. 530, 137 A.2d 704 (1958) (decision changed by sub-
sequent statutory enactment) ; Binney v. Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Co., 43 R.I. 222,
110 Atl. 615 (1920).
14. Re Sparrow, L.R. 20 Ch. D. 320 (C.A.) (1882) (to maintain the donee
according to his status).
15. E.g., Ex parte Whitbread, 2 Mer. 99, 35 Eng. Rep. 878 (1816).
16. E.g., In re Flagler, 248 N.Y. 415, 162 N.E. 471 (1928).
17. 10 Pa. D.&C.2d 682 (Orphans' Ct. Delaware County 1957).
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produced a surplus income of over $1,000. The incompetent, who was
then sixty-two years of age and who had been under mental treatment for
a period of twenty-five years, was confined to a veteran's hospital, where
he was subject to no charge for his maintenance. An immediate distribu-
tion of $2,500 to the ward's wife and to each of his two daughters was
requested, as well as such further periodic distributions from income as
the guardian deemed prudent. The Pennsylvania statute provided that
"[t]he court, for cause shown, may authorize or direct the payment or
application of any or all of the income or principal of the estate of an
incompetent for the care, maintenance or education of the incompetent, his
spouse, children or those for whom he was making such provision before
his incompetency. . . ."8 The court advanced several reasons for their
denial of the petition. They cited the aforementioned statute as rigidly
circumscribing their range of discretion. The possibility that the incom-
petent might recover and make a new will were given as additional deter-
rents. Furthermore, the court noted that if one of the prospective donees
predeceased the ward, it would effect a change in the anticipated heirs of
his estate. Finally, the court suggested that tax avoidance was not a
proper motive for permitting an inter-vivos gift.
When the issue was next presented, a New York court reached a
different result. In In re Carson19 the court approved that part of a prior
order which authorized a gift of a portion of the corpus of the incompetent's
estate to the ward's son, but declined to sanction the part of the same
order which directed that a similar gift be made to the daughter. The
distinguishing factor offered was that the latter order would directly
conflict with a specific provision of the ward's will. The potential donees
were the incompetent's next of kin, his only known relatives, and the
principal legatees under his will. Though the ward was in extremis2 ° at
the time of the petition, the corpus remaining after the distribution would
have been ample to provide for him if death did not follow as speedily as
predicted. The court concluded that the existence of the will naming the
prospective donees as the objects of her bounty was sufficient evidence
to indicate that the incompetent, if sane, would have made a similar gift
to effect the substantial savings in taxes and administration expenses.
In re duPont2' followed Carson and arrived at a similar conclusion.
There, the desired distributions were to be made to the children and grand-
children by way of an inter-vivos trust, which substantially conformed to
the terms of the ward's will. The ward was eighty-six years old and perma-
nently disabled both mentally and physically. His estate, which was valued
at some $176,000,000, produced a surplus income of about $600,000 a year.
The tax-saving gifts would deplete the ward's estate by about $57,000,000,
18. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 3644 (1956).
19. 39 Misc. 2d 544, 241 N.Y.S.2d 288 (1962).
20. The ward died shortly after the granting of the order. Id. at 545, 241 N.Y.S..2d
at 289.
21. 194 A.2d 309 (Del. Ch. 1963).
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but undoubtedly would leave him with sufficient income to maintain him
munificiently. The evidence indicated that the ward was sophisticated in
the ways of taxes, had made sizeable gifts to his family in the past, and,
in all probability, would have made the proposed gifts except for the
pendency of the Du Pont-General Motors anti-trust action.'2  The court
concluded that the ward, if competent, would have made the requested
grants and, substituting its judgment for that of the ward, approved the
guardian's petition.
Finally, In re Trusteeship of Kenan23 provided the opportunity for
an articulation of the limits of the doctrine. The guardian petitioned the
court for authorization to make substantial gifts, of both income and prin-
cipal, to charity and to surrender the right to revoke a trust reserved by
the incompetent. Both steps were designed to provide substantial savings
in estate taxes. The ward was a widow with no lineal descendants, and
probably would never regain sufficient mental capacity to manage her
affairs. Her annual taxable income substantially exceeded $2,000,000 a
year, and making the proposed gifts would leave income adequate to main-
tain her in the manner to which she was accustomed. The ward had
retained a competent tax advisor who testified that she was well aware of
the impact of taxes; her will and the trust arrangement had been drafted
by an attorney well versed in the field of estate and trust work and taxation.
The court ordered continuance of the gifts to charity which had been
undertaken previously by the ward, but since no evidence was produced
to indicate that the ward would have made the proposed gifts, if sane, they
refused to authorize the further gifts. The mere fact the legislature or the
court thought they should be made could not replace evidence of the
ward's intent.
IV.
THE METHOD OF DECISION
A. Preliminary Determinations
Two preliminary determinations face the court in deciding whether
the funds of the incompetent should be applied to the use of others. First,
it must find that it has the power to grant such allowances. If it possesses
jurisdiction, the second step is to decide whether it desires to adopt and
apply the doctrine of substitution of judgment. As previously mentioned,
the decided cases are in conflict over the source of this power, but a number
of jurisdictions hold that the courts possess it independent of statute.
2 4
Some state statutes, recognizing the public benefit to be derived from
22. The ward was one of the defendants in the DuPont - General Motors anti-
trust action charged with trying to keep the control of DuPont within the family.
The court reasoned that the pendency of this action kept the ward from instituting an
earlier plan to distribute the Christiana Securities stock. When the action terminated,
the ward was no longer able to effectuate such a plan. Id. at 312.
23. 261 N.C. 1, 134 S.E.2d 85 (1964).
24. E.g., New York Re Willoughby, 5 N.Y. Chan. Rep. 254 (1844).
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contributions to charitable, religious, and governmental institutions, specific-
ally authorize such gifts from the incompetent's estate.25 Both the Kenan
and duPont cases exemplify exercises of purely statutory jurisdiction. In
Kenan, the minuscle amount of the ward's present income that would have
ultimately accrued to her heirs and legatees as a result of federal income
and estate taxes, induced the guardian to invoke the aid of such a statute.
In re duPont reflects the liberal attitude of the judiciary in applying the
principle of substituted judgment where the power to so proceed is purely
statutory. There, the court found authorization to order the distributions
in a statute providing that "a trustee may do whatever is necessary for the
care, preservation, and increase of his ward's estate."2 6 The court reasoned
that the interest of the eventual successors to the ward's estate was
implicitly identified with the ward's interest. Such a statute could have
been construed as merely restating the traditional refusal to recognize the
doctrine of substitution of judgment founded on the theory that an increase
in the assets of the estate of the incompetent is the guardian's undeviating
duty. 27 On the basis of duPont, the Pennsylvania statute,28 construed by
Bullock Estate as circumscribing the court's discretion, could be inter-
preted as embracing gifts solely for tax-saving purposes. Should the
guardian present more evidence of the incompetent's intent, that Pennsyl-
vania decision might not preclude such a liberal application in the future.2 9
B. The Standards of Determination
Assuming the court decides it has the requisite power and desires to
invoke the doctrine of substitution of judgment, it arrives at a more per-
plexing problem of properly applying the doctrine. Authorization of the
gift does not follow as a necessary corollary. Rather, the court must deter-
mine what the incompetent would have done. An analysis of the cases
in the non-tax field has led one author8" to suggest that the courts have
employed three standards in making their determination:
25. N.C. G.N. STAT. ch. 35, § 29.1-29.10 (1955).
26. DZL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3705 (1953).
27. In re Rieley's Estate, 194 N.E.2d 918 (Ohio Prob. Ct. 1963) (dictum) (The
court permitted the estate of the wife to pass directly to her legatees and devisees
under the provisions of her will rather than directing the guardian of her affluent
husband to elect to take under the law of descent and distribution, when it was demon-
strated that this would be consistent with the plan of the husband and wife to
minimize their estate and inheritance taxes.)
28. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 3644 (1954).
29. The opacity of the court's discussion on the ambit of the statute and the
enumeration of several reasons for denying the petition suggest that the absence of
statutory power might not have been a truly determinative factor. The court stated,
with reference to the statute: "The foregoing statutory provision circumscribes the
power and authority of the guardian to make dispositions of the principal and income
of the incompetent's estate. There is no ambit of discretion except within the orbit
of the powers expressly conferred or necessarily implied from the statute .... [giving
additional reasons for their decision]. For the reasons herein stated, the court is
without power to grant the relief prayed for." Bullock Estate, 10 Pa. D.&C.2d
684-85 (Orphans' Ct. Delaware County 1957).
30. Comment, 17 CALIF. L. REv. 175, 177-78 (1929).
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1. Objective standard - A determination of what the average, rea-
sonable man would do under the circumstances and a continuation on that
basis, without regard to the past conduct or practices of the lunatic.
2. Strict subjective standard - An ascertainment of the donees and
the extent of gifts made by the lunatic, while sane; the resulting order
would authorize a continuation only of such gifts.
3. Liberal subjective standard - A consideration of the past course
of this particular incompetent's conduct, and, based on such facts, a deter-
mination of his probable action in this particular instance.
As universal standards to be applied to every case, each of these tests
possesses certain patent defects. By disregarding the past conduct of the
ward, the reasonable man rule ignores the liberality or niggardliness of the
very individual who accumulated the funds sought to be distributed. Thus,
his already circumscribed right to manage and dispose of his estate as he
might wish is further impinged. The North Carolina court suggests that
such a practice would venture beyond the province of the judiciary and
constitute a deprivation of property without due process of law.8 ' Certainly,
some limits must be imposed upon the courts in these matters. On the
other hand, the subjective tests, by focusing solely on the past conduct
and practices of the lunatic, overlook the likelihood of future conduct at
variance with his prior activity. The passage of time between an adjudica-
tion of incompetency and a petition for a distribution render it probable
that an individual might be more disposed to distribute his property in this
manner. Experience bears out the proposition that liberality in such matters
of beneficience increases with the age of the donor.
8 2
C. Additional Factors For Consideration
Rather than adhering to any one of these standards, the court should
appraise pertinent factual matters and determine whether it would be rea-
sonable for this particular person to make the desired distributions. Rele-
vant factors 8 to be considered would be the age and life expectancy of the
incompenent; his present and probable future requirements for his own
maintenance; his relationship and intimacy with the prospective donees,
both before and during incompetency; the incurability of his condition;
his concern for tax minimization and estate planning; and such other factors
as the incompetent would consider in making a similar decision. In the
absence of evidence indicating a contrary intention, it does not seem unrea-
sonable for the court to presume that an older person, recognizing the
disparity between gift and estate taxes, would desire to distribute some of
31. In re Trusteeship of Kenan, 261 N.C. 1, 134 S.E.2d 85 (1964). The court
implicitly recognized such a position when it held that it could not authorize the gifts
merely because of a personal belief that they should be made, since this would be in
derogation of the incompetent's constitutional rights.
32. See ALLEN, EcoNomIcS oF PUBLIc FINANCS (2d ed. 1954).
33. A number of these factors cited are taken from the brief of the Amicus Curiae
filed in the In re DuPont decision pp. 113-15.
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his estate by way of inter-vivos gifts to the natural objects of his bounty.34
The primary element tending toward a contrary result would be provision
for his own maintenance. Obviously, this would be of primary importance
among the aforementioned factors.
Testing the decided cases by a standard of reasonableness, In re duPont
and In re Trusteeship of Kenan certainly contain sufficient evidence of the
incompetent's past conduct to determine his putative intent and support
their disparate conclusions. Although In re Carson lacked such abundant
evidence, the impending death of the incompetent, combined with the fact
that the prospective donees were the only children and the beneficiaries
under her will, rendered the decision, directing the distribution, reasonable.
The advanced age of the ward, the gratuitous maintenance provided him,
the size of the requested distributions, the relationship of the prospective
donees, and the content of his will indicate that the application of the
principle would have been apposite in Bullock Estate.
D. Considerations Against Flexibility
While intelligent estate planning for the incompetent demands a cer-
tain degree of flexibility, the facility with which involuntary guardianship
can be imposed necessitates some adherence to the traditional policy of
restraint in dealing with requested distributions. Most state statutes35
provide that a relative or any interested person may petition the court for
the appointment of a guardian to manage the property of an alleged in-
competent. The test employed in making an adjudication of competency
is whether the alleged incompetent can rationally manage his business
affairs.3 6 A minimal amount of mental impairment plus any errant economic
conduct will often satisfy this criterion.3 7 The liberality of the court in
decreeing wardship" and the non-adversary nature of the proceedings
3 9
offer predatory heirs a propitious opportunity to protect their expectant
interests by initiating proceedings. An unrestrained attitude in granting
inter-vivos gifts will only stimulate and encourage petitions for involuntary
guardianship by heirs and legatees desirous of reaping a windfall through
a premature distribution of their aged benefactor's estate.
To deter any unsavory practice, the court should appoint a guardian
ad litent to protect the ward's interest, both before the initiation of guardian-
ship proceedings and before considering a petition for distribution. This
latter procedure was pursued in Kenan. By contrast, the opinion in
34. See BUCHANAN, THE PUBLIC FINANCES (1960).
35. E.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 3307 (1954).
36. Graham v. Clapp, 191 Iowa 1224, 184 N.W. 329 (1921) ; 45 IOWA L. Rv. 360,
366 (1960).
37. Note, The Disguised Oppression of Involuntary Guardianship: Have the
Elderly Freedom to Spend? 73 YALE L.J. 676, 680 (1964). A guardian can be appointed
in Delaware even though the ward is only physically incapacitated. (DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 12. § 3914 (1953).)
38. Note, The Disguised Oppression of Involuntary Guardianship: Have the
Elderly Freedon to Spend? supra note 37, at 676.
39. E.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 3301 (1954).
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Carson does not disclose whether anyone represented the ward; and in
duPont, an Amicus Curiae served as the only shield against impropriety.
The solicitude of both of these courts in insuring that the incompetent's
present and probable wants would be satisfactorily supplied cannot be
glossed over; but, a court-appointed guardian representing only the ward's
interest would have been a more effective safeguard.
V.
LIMITATION ON TAX AVOIDANCE
Even if the court authorizes the proposed gifts, the estate planner's
efforts in minimizing taxes will be somewhat negated if the gifts are held
to be in contemplation of death. 40 The Supreme Court in City Bank
Farmers Trust Co. v. McGowan4' held that the court-authorized gifts to
the children of the incompetent, which were obviously intended to accelerate
enjoyment of the estate, were includable in the gross taxable estate. On
the contrary, gifts to the same children commenced prior to incompetency
and donations to destitute collateral relatives were held not to be in con-
templation of death and thus were excluded from the estate for tax purposes.
Such exclusion can be achieved only if the ward survives the making of
the gift by three years or the representative of the estate is able to prove
that a life-time motive prompted the distribution.4 2 A settled policy of
the incompetent to make liberal gifts to children ;43 an intent to avoid high
income taxes 44 or the burdens of managing the donated property ;45 and
an intent primarily to provide independent income or security for depend-
ents or family46 have been construed as motives adequate to distinguish
these from gifts in contemplation of death and might be applicable in the
guardian-ward context. Moreover, where the dominant motive is other than
the thought of death, an additional motive to avoid estate or inheritance




The decisions sanctioning such distributions promote economic stability
by stimulating the distribution of capital. Blind insistence that the estate
of an incompetent remain intact throughout the entire period of incom-
petency seems to ignore reality. Certainly, situations can be conceived where
40. Some tax saving will probably be realized even if the gifts are held to be in
contemplation of death. See INT. Rzv. CODX OF 1954, § 2012.
41. 323 U.S. 594 (1945).
42. INT. Rev. CODE oF 1954, § 2035.
43. U.S. v. Wells, 283 U.S. 102 (1931).
44. Becker v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 296 U.S. 48 (1935).
45. Welch v. Hassett, 90 F.2d 833 (1st Cir. 1937).
46. Delaware Trust Co. Exec. (Wm. DuPont Est.) v. Handy, 53 F.2d 1042 (3d
Cir. 1931).
47. Allen v. Trust Co., 326 U.S. 630 (1946).
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the incompetent would desire to make distributions prior to his death.
Changes in the estate, in the needs of distributees, in the tax laws, or merely
in the age of the donor may well have an impact on his donative intentions.
By analyzing the factors dominant in each case, courts can come to a
reasonably valid judgment of the incompetent's probable intent. Effective
limitations and safeguards are available to insure proper judicial discretion.
Use of the doctrine of substituted judgment enables courts to transform
restrictive legal principles into effective tools for administration.
Joseph C. Kelly
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